Agency

In trying to spell out the distinction between activity and passivity and what is special about agency, philosophers have tended to focus on human intentional action. This Element presents the classical approach, conscious agency, and the joint agency. The joint agency presents the different forms of coordination.

In trying to spell out the distinction between activity and passivity and what is special about agency, philosophers have tended to focus on human intentional action as their paradigm case. Yet taking intentional agency as a starting point makes it difficult to offer positive accounts of more elementary forms of agency. I first present this classical approach and discuss some of its limitations. I then consider simpler forms of behavior and the minimal conditions they must meet to be considered genuine forms of agency. I then turn to conscious agency, examining the nature and sources of our conscious agentive states, their reliability and the causal role they may play in shaping our actions. Finally, I discuss joint agency, the different forms of coordination among agents on which the success of joint action depends, and the sense of agency in joint action.