Arms, Revenue, and Entitlements : U.S. Deficits in the Cold War, 1945-1991

Arms, Revenue, and Entitlements: U.S. Deficits in the Cold War, 1945-1991 explores how defense, tax, and entitlement policies caused the U.S. government to become deficit normative during the Cold War era, arguing that only a comprehensive program can rein in deficits in the twenty-first century.

In the second half of the twentieth century, strategic and economic conditions compelled the U.S. government to start running budget deficits on a permanent basis. A new role of global leadership in containing communism required a robust military establishment. The government overwhelmingly relied for general revenue on an income tax code that also could not impede economic growth. And general revenue increasingly funded transfer payments in an expanding entitlement state. Fiscal overstretch resulted in unending deficits which continue to this day. At first the shift to deficit normality was not obvious. The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations attempted to hold the line on deficits, but this commitment gradually weakened in later years. Arms, Revenue, and Entitlements: 1945-1991 looks at the Cold War era from a budgetary perspective, how defense spending, income tax reductions, and entitlement programs all contributed to the emergence of the deficit normative state. As national debt continues to climb in the twenty-first century, Arms, Revenue, and Entitlements: U.S. Deficits in the Cold War, 1945-1991 shows how the government reached this point, and how a comprehensive policy approach might again restore fiscal stability.