Beyond Moral Fundamentalism : Toward a Pragmatic Pluralism

“Moral fundamentalism” is Steven Fesmire''s term for the habit of acting as though one has access to the exclusively right way to diagnose problems, along with the only practical solution. This habit causes us to oversimplify situations, neglect broader context, take refuge in dogmatic absolutes, ignore possibilities for finding common ground, assume privileged access to the right way to proceed, and shut off honest inquiry. Moral fundamentalism makes it impossible to debate and achieve superordinate social goals, such as public health, justice, security, sustainability, peace, and democracy. Drawing from John Dewey''s pluralistic and pragmatic approach to philosophical questions, Fesmire develops an alternative to both the oversimplification of moral fundamentalism and the arbitrariness of relativism, which he terms "pragmatic pluralism."

While complex global problems cry out for solutions devised with moral sensitivity and responsibility, a more common mentality tends to prevail, one that assumes those going the right way (“us”) are endangered by others (“them”) going the wrong way. Philosopher Steven Fesmire calls this approach “moral fundamentalism,” the idea that only we have access to the right diagnosis and prescription to our problems. Moral fundamentalism causes us to oversimplify, neglect broader context, take refuge in dogmatic absolutes, ignore possibilities for common ground, assume privileged access to the right way to proceed, and shut off honest inquiry. Moral fundamentalism--exacerbated by social media silos--also makes the worst of native impulses toward social bonding and antagonism. This depletes social capital and makes it impossible to debate and achieve superordinate goals, such as public health, justice, security, sustainability, peace, and democracy. Drawing from John Dewey''s pluralistic and pragmatic approach, Fesmire develops an alternative to the oversimplification of moral fundamentalism and the arbitrariness of relativism. He proposes a “pragmatic pluralism” that can be applied to complex ethical, political, educational, and policy problems--without flattening variability among values or presuming that abstract theories determine what we ought to do. He argues that the single-right-way premise that logically underlies moral fundamentalism is both unwarranted and constrictive, and that grand philosophical quests for unifying principles can still be accommodated within a wider pluralistic approach. In an engaging style, Fesmire shows the reader a new perspective on the challenges and promises of democratic decision-making in societies that are struggling to grow beyond moral fundamentalism.