Confronting Saddam Hussein : George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq

In Confronting Saddam Hussein, Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes why the US went to war in Iraq in 2003 and who was most responsible for the decision. Employing a unique set of personal interviews with dozens of top officials and declassified American and British documents, Leffler vividly portrays the emotions and anxieties that shaped the thinking of the president after the shocking events of 9/11. As the book unfolds, the centrality of Bush''s role becomes more and more evident. A necessary reassessment of George W. Bush''s intervention in Iraq, Confronting Saddam Hussein provides a provocative reinterpretation of the most important international event of the 21st century.

A vivid portrayal of what drove George W. Bush to invade Iraq in 2003--an outcome that was in no way predetermined. America''s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 is arguably the most important foreign policy choice of the entire post-Cold War era. Nearly two decades after the event, it remains central to understanding current international politics and US foreign relations.In Confronting Saddam Hussein, the eminent historian of US foreign policy Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes why the US chose war and who was most responsible for the decision. Employing a unique set of personal interviews with dozens of top officials and declassified American and British documents, Leffler vividly portrays the emotions and anxieties that shaped the thinking of the president after the shocking events of 9/11. He shows how fear, hubris, and power influenced Bush''s approach to Saddam Hussein''s Iraq. At the core of Leffler''s account is his compelling portrait of Saddam Hussein. Rather than stressing Bush''s preoccupation with promoting freedom or democracy, Leffler emphasizes Hussein''s brutality, opportunism, and unpredictability and illuminates how the Iraqi dictator''s record of aggression and intransigence haunted the president and influenced his calculations. Bush was not eager for war, and the decision to invade Iraq was not a fait accompli. Yet the president was convinced that only by practicing coercive diplomacy and threatening force could he alter Hussein''s defiance, a view shared by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders around the world, including Hans Blix, the chief UN inspector. Throughout, Leffler highlights the harrowing anxieties surrounding the decision-making process after the devastating attack on 9/11 and explains the roles of contingency, agency, rationality, and emotion. As the book unfolds, Bush''s centrality becomes more and more evident, as does the bureaucratic dysfunctionality that contributed to the disastrous occupation of Iraq. A compelling reassessment of George W. Bush''s intervention in Iraq, Confronting Saddam Hussein provides a provocative reinterpretation of the most important international event of the 21st century.