Differential Information Economies
Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2005
Book Details
Format
Paperback / Softback
Book Series
Studies in Economic Theory
ISBN-10
3642059775
ISBN-13
9783642059773
Edition
Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2005
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
Imprint
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Country of Manufacture
DE
Country of Publication
GB
Publication Date
Oct 21st, 2010
Print length
650 Pages
Product Classification:
Economic theory & philosophyEconomic theory and philosophyGame theory
Ksh 32,400.00
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One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game.
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
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