Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism

Ethical subjectivists hold that moral judgements are descriptions of our attitudes. Expressivists hold that they are expressions of our attitudes. Can these views accommodate three central features of moral practice: practicality of moral judgements, phenomenon of moral disagreement, and mind-independence of some moral truths?

Ethical subjectivists hold that moral judgements are descriptions of our attitudes. Expressivists hold that they are expressions of our attitudes. These views cook with the same ingredients – the natural world, and our reactions to it – and have similar attractions. This Element assesses each of them by considering whether they can accommodate three central features of moral practice: the practicality of moral judgements, the phenomenon of moral disagreement, and the mind-independence of some moral truths. In the process, several different versions of subjectivism are distinguished (simple, communal, idealising, and normative) and key expressivist notions such as ''moral attitudes'' and ''expression'' are examined. Different meanings of ''subjective'' and ''relative'' are examined and it is considered whether subjectivism and expressivism make ethics ''subjective'' or ''relative'' in each of these senses.