Evolutionary Games and the Replicator Dynamics
Book Details
Format
Hardback or Cased Book
Book Series
Elements in Evolutionary Economics
ISBN-10
1009472305
ISBN-13
9781009472302
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Imprint
Cambridge University Press
Country of Manufacture
GB
Country of Publication
GB
Publication Date
Jun 6th, 2024
Print length
100 Pages
Weight
300 grams
Dimensions
23.60 x 15.90 x 1.40 cms
Product Classification:
Economics
Ksh 10,100.00
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This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. The authors provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes.
This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. Under this hypothesis the replicator dynamics evolves in a Banach space of finite signed measures. The authors provide a general framework to study the stability of the replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in this Banach space. This allows them to establish a relation between Nash equilibria and the stability of the replicator for normal a form games applicable to oligopoly models, theory of international trade, public good models, the tragedy of commons, and War of attrition game among others. They also provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes.
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