Forgetting How to Win : The U.S. Army, State Department, and USAID in Modern Post-Combat Operations
Book Details
Format
Hardback or Cased Book
Book Series
Praeger Security International
ISBN-10
876514227Y
ISBN-13
9798765142271
Publisher
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Imprint
Bloomsbury Academic
Country of Manufacture
GB
Country of Publication
GB
Publication Date
Nov 13th, 2025
Print length
224 Pages
Weight
460 grams
Dimensions
23.20 x 15.00 x 1.80 cms
Ksh 15,550.00
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Examines how three American national security institutions (the U.S. Army, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development) adapted to address unexpected and unfamiliar post-combat crises.
By examining how three American national security institutions (the U.S. Army, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development) adapted to address unexpected and unfamiliar post-combat crises, this book reveals the four shared techniques which led to their success.
Focusing on topics such as crisis response, adaptation, pragmatic policy solutions, and personal relationships, Jeremy Kasper introduces four pivotal case studies which examine how national security institutions responded to post-combat operations in Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, and Afghanistan between 1983-2008.
This book gives a key account of the soldiers, diplomats, and foreign aid practitioners who responded to unexpected crises during post-conflict reconstruction - a dynamic, unfamiliar, and complex mission far outside their respective organization''s core mission. Focusing on how bureaucracies struggled to apply the diplomatic, military, and economic dimensions of national power in pursuit of U.S. policy goals, this book ultimately exposes institutional forgetfulness, such that hard-won lessons did little to shape subsequent crises.
Focusing on topics such as crisis response, adaptation, pragmatic policy solutions, and personal relationships, Jeremy Kasper introduces four pivotal case studies which examine how national security institutions responded to post-combat operations in Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, and Afghanistan between 1983-2008.
This book gives a key account of the soldiers, diplomats, and foreign aid practitioners who responded to unexpected crises during post-conflict reconstruction - a dynamic, unfamiliar, and complex mission far outside their respective organization''s core mission. Focusing on how bureaucracies struggled to apply the diplomatic, military, and economic dimensions of national power in pursuit of U.S. policy goals, this book ultimately exposes institutional forgetfulness, such that hard-won lessons did little to shape subsequent crises.
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