Governing for the Long Term : Democracy and the Politics of Investment

This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, seeking to understand how elected officials make trade-offs between the present and the future. The book develops a theory of 'intertemporal policy choice', then analyzes how governments in four countries have managed long-term challenges to their pension systems.

In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking.