High Command : British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

Why didn't the British Military high command achieve much better results in 2000-10 in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what accounts for this poor performance?

** Includes a New Postcript ''The Chilcot Report—Early Thoughts on Military Matters''** From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. ''Victory'' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated.In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable.