Hybrid Regimes within Democracies : Fiscal Federalism and Subnational Rentier States

Scholars, applied researchers, and government officials interested in understanding and improving democracy, subnational governance, fiscal federalism, and the management of rent-like revenues, will be interested in this book. It will particularly appeal to analysts of Argentina, and of subnational regimes in Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Mexico, and the USA.

From the racially segregated ''Jim Crow'' US South to the many electoral but hardly democratic local regimes in Argentina and other federal democracies, the political rights of citizens around the world are often curtailed by powerful subnational rulers. Hybrid Regimes within Democracies presents the first comprehensive study of democracy and authoritarianism in all the subnational units of a federation. The book focuses on Argentina, but also contains a comparative chapter that considers seven other federations including Germany, Mexico, and the United States. The in-depth and multidimensional description of subnational regimes in all Argentine provinces is complemented with an innovative explanation for the large differences between those that are democratic and those that are ''hybrid'' - complex combinations of democratic and authoritarian elements. Putting forward and testing an original theory of subnational democracy, Gervasoni extends the rentier-state explanatory logic from resource rents to the more general concept of ''fiscal rents'', including ''fiscal federalism rents'', and from the national to the subnational level.