Inclusive Legal Positivism

This book develops a general, philosophical theory about the nature of law and its relationship with morality. Its central theoretical question is whether, in determining the extent of our legal rights and obligations, judges must appeal to moral principles and values. The author argues that they often do, and develops a philosophical theory which accomodates this fact.

This book develops a general theory of law – inclusive legal positivism – which seeks to remain within the tradition represented by authors such as Austin, Hart, MacCormick, and Raz, while sharing some of the virtues of both classical and modern theories of natural law, as represented by authors such as Aquinas, Fuller, Finnis, and Dworkin. W. J. Walchow articulates and defends his own version of legal positivism, which is a refinement and development of the views of H. L. A. Hart. The author shows how inclusive legal positivism demonstrates that the existence or content of positive law does depend on moral considerations; and that this is consistent with legal positivism.In addition, Waluchow helps to remove the confusion which has marred current jurisprudential debates about the nature of law. He argues that these debates are often clouded by failures to appreciate that different theorists are offering different kinds of theories and attempting to answer different questions. He also accuses theorists, principally Ronald Dworkin, of failing to characterize opposing theories correctly.