Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology

What is judgement? is a question that has exercised generations of philosophers. Early analytic philosophers (Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein) and phenomenologists (Brentano, Husserl and Reinach) changed how philosophers think about this question.  This book explores and assesses their contributions and help us to retrace their steps.

The prevalent view of judgement in late Modern philosophy was the idea that judgement is the synthesis of representations into a unity. The synthesis model of judgement proved to be highly influential. Idealists on the Continent and in Britain conceived of judgement as a unifying act. However, the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century saw a major change in the theory of judgement. Early analytic philosophers such as Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein as well as phenomenologists such as Brentano, Husserl and Reinach changed how philosophers think about judgement. This collection explores and assesses the contributions of these philosophers to the theory of judgement. Its historical approach allows us to get a clearer picture of judgement and the related notion of truth. The book will be of interest for anyone working on the history of analytic philosophy, phenomenology and philosophy of mind.