Kant and Rational Psychology

Corey W. Dyck presents a new account of Kant's criticism of the rational investigation of the soul in the Critique of Pure Reason, in light of its eighteenth-century German context. He reinterprets the aims and results of the Paralogisms, and illuminates Kant's discussion of the soul's substantiality, simplicity, personality, and existence.

Corey W. Dyck presents a new account of Kant''s criticism of the rational investigation of the soul in his monumental Critique of Pure Reason, in light of its eighteenth-century German context. When characterizing the rational psychology that is Kant''s target in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason chapter of the Critique commentators typically only refer to an approach to, and an account of, the soul found principally in the thought of Descartes and Leibniz. But Dyck argues that to do so is to overlook the distinctive rational psychology developed by Christian Wolff, which emphasized the empirical foundation of any rational cognition of the soul, and which was widely influential among eighteenth-century German philosophers, including Kant. In this book, Dyck reveals how the received conception of the aim and results of Kant''s Paralogisms must be revised in light of a proper understanding of the rational psychology that is the most proximate target of Kant''s attack. In particular, he contends that Kant''s criticism hinges upon exposing the illusory basis of the rational psychologist''s claims inasmuch as he falls prey to the appearance of the soul as being given in inner experience. Moreover, Dyck demonstrates that significant light can be shed on Kant''s discussion of the soul''s substantiality, simplicity, personality, and existence by considering the Paralogisms in this historical context.