Leveraging Latency : How the Weak Compel the Strong with Nuclear Technology
Book Details
Format
Hardback or Cased Book
Book Series
Disruptive Technology and International Security
ISBN-10
0197669530
ISBN-13
9780197669532
Publisher
Oxford University Press Inc
Imprint
Oxford University Press Inc
Country of Manufacture
GB
Country of Publication
GB
Publication Date
Mar 31st, 2023
Print length
264 Pages
Weight
498 grams
Dimensions
16.40 x 24.20 x 2.80 cms
Product Classification:
Arms negotiation & control
Ksh 4,950.00
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In Leveraging Latency, Tristan A. Volpe explores how weak nations compel concessions from superpowers by threatening to acquire atomic weapons. Volpe finds that there is a trade-off between threatening proliferation and promising nuclear restraint. States need just enough bomb-making capacity to threaten proliferation, but not so much that it becomes too difficult for them to offer nonproliferation assurances. Including four comparative case studies and identifying a generalizable mechanism--the threat-assurance tradeoff--Volpe provides a systematic assessment of the coercive utility of nuclear technology.
Over the last seven decades, some states successfully leveraged the threat of acquiring atomic weapons to compel concessions from superpowers. For many others, however, this coercive gambit failed to work. When does nuclear latency--the technical capacity to build the bomb--enable states to pursue effective coercion?In Leveraging Latency, Tristan A. Volpe argues that having greater capacity to build weaponry doesn''t translate to greater coercive advantage. Volpe finds that there is a trade-off between threatening proliferation and promising nuclear restraint. States need just enough bomb-making capacity to threaten proliferation, but not so much that it becomes too difficult for them to offer nonproliferation assurances. The boundaries of this sweet spot align with the capacity to produce the fissile material at the heart of an atomic weapon.To test this argument, Volpe includes comparative case studies of four countries that leveraged latency against superpowers: Japan, West Germany, North Korea, and Iran. In doing so, Volpe identifies a generalizable mechanism--the threat-assurance trade-off--that explains why more power often makes compellence less likely to work. This framework illuminates how technology shapes broader bargaining dynamics and helps to refine policy options for inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. As nuclear technology continues to cast a shadow over the global landscape, Leveraging Latency provides a systematic assessment of its coercive utility.
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