Market Design Powers of the European Commission? : Remedies under Articles 7 and 9 Regulation 1/03

Using article 7 as a normative benchmark, it shows that most of the criticism levelled at the Commission's article 9 decisions and the Alrosa judgment of the CJEU is not justified, since critics tend to over-state both the rigour of article 7 and the laxness of article 9.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the remedies practice the European Commission has adopted on the basis of articles 7 and 9 of regulation 1/03. Using article 7 as a normative benchmark, it shows that most of the criticism levelled at the Commission''s article 9 decisions and the Alrosa judgment of the CJEU is not justified, since critics tend to over-state both the rigour of article 7 and the laxness of article 9. Remaining inconsistencies between the commitment practice and the standards for infringement decisions can, it is submitted, be justified by the consensual nature of commitment decisions and their underlying goal of procedural economy. Moreover, it is suggested that too little importance is generally assigned to the beneficial effect which commitments bring about by providing for precise and enforceable obligations without sacrificing the concerned undertakings'' freedom to choose how to put the infringement to an end. Adopting a case-oriented approach, this study provides valuable insights for academics and practitioners alike.