Military Strategy In Transition : Defense And Deterrence In The 1980s

Current NATO military strategy is based on the policy of flexible response that U.S. and European politicians endorsed in 1967; for over 15 years, no fundamental changes in NATO''s defense strategy have occurred. If NATO cannot stop a Warsaw Pact aggression conventionally, it continues to threaten a gradual and controlled nuclear escalation of both theater and strategic nuclear weapons. Many analysts now question the fundamental principles underlying NATO''s policy and strategy, given the enormous changes that have occurred in the strategic environment between 1967 and 1984. The contributors to this book examine the recent proposal by Samuel Huntington, who advocates that NATO adopt a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy based on offensive military actions deep into Eastern Europe. In evaluating this new proposal, the authors analyze the potential impact that it would have on U.S. and NATO military doctrine, assess probable European and Soviet reactions to NATO adopting a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy, and address the linkages existing between conventional and nuclear strategy. In the final chapter, the editors consider the policy, strategy, and force structure questions raised in the book and recommend policy options for the United States.

Current NATO military strategy is based on the policy of flexible response that U.S. and European politicians endorsed in 1967; for over 15 years, no fundamental changes in NATO''s defense strategy have occurred. If NATO cannot stop a Warsaw Pact aggression conventionally, it continues to threaten a gradual and controlled nuclear escalation of both theater and strategic nuclear weapons. Many analysts now question the fundamental principles underlying NATO''s policy and strategy, given the enormous changes that have occurred in the strategic environment between 1967 and 1984. The contributors to this book examine the recent proposal by Samuel Huntington, who advocates that NATO adopt a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy based on offensive military actions deep into Eastern Europe. In evaluating this new proposal, the authors analyze the potential impact that it would have on U.S. and NATO military doctrine, assess probable European and Soviet reactions to NATO adopting a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy, and address the linkages existing between conventional and nuclear strategy. In the final chapter, the editors consider the policy, strategy, and force structure questions raised in the book and recommend policy options for the United States.