Mobilizing Poor Voters : Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina

Mobilizing Poor Voters describes and explains the emergence, maintenance, and disappearance of political, partisan, and social networks. Using data gathered through field research in Argentina, this book explains why candidates use clientelistic strategies to mobilize poor voters. Scholars studying clientelism, political parties, poverty, and democratic consolidation will find this book useful.

Democracy has provided opportunities for political representation and accountability, but it has also created incentives for creating and maintaining clientelistic networks. Why has clientelism consolidated with the introduction of democracy? Drawing on network analysis, Mobilizing Poor Voters answers this question by describing and explaining the emergence, maintenance, and disappearance of political, partisan, and social networks in Argentina. Combining qualitative and quantitative data gathered during twenty-four months of field research in eight municipalities in Argentina, Mobilizing Poor Voters shows that when party leaders distribute political promotions to party candidates based only on the number of voters they mobilize, party leaders incentivize the use of clientelistic strategies among candidates competing to mobilize voters in poor neighborhoods. The logic of perverse incentives examined in this book explains why candidates who use clientelism succeed in getting elected and re-elected over time, contributing to the consolidation of political machines at the local level.