Necessary Beings : An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them
by
Bob Hale
Book Details
Format
Hardback or Cased Book
ISBN-10
0199669570
ISBN-13
9780199669578
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Imprint
Oxford University Press
Country of Manufacture
GB
Country of Publication
GB
Publication Date
Sep 19th, 2013
Print length
310 Pages
Weight
630 grams
Dimensions
23.80 x 16.50 x 2.40 cms
Product Classification:
Philosophy of languagePhilosophy: metaphysics & ontologyPhilosophy: logic
Ksh 19,600.00
Manufactured on Demand
Delivery in 29 days
Delivery Location
Delivery fee: Select location
Delivery in 29 days
Secure
Quality
Fast
Bob Hale presents a broadly Fregean approach to metaphysics, according to which ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another. He argues that facts about what kinds of things exist depend on facts about what is possible. Modal facts are fundamental, and have their basis in the essences of things--not in meanings or concepts.
Necessary Beings is concerned with two central areas of metaphysics: modality--the theory of necessity, possibility, and other related notions; and ontology--the general study of what kinds of entities there are. Bob Hale''s overarching purpose is to develop and defend two quite general theses about what is required for the existence of entities of various kinds: that questions about what kinds of things there are cannot be properly understood or adequately answered without recourse to considerations about possibility and necessity, and that, conversely, questions about the nature and basis of necessity and possibility cannot be satisfactorily tackled without drawing on what might be called the methodology of ontology. Taken together, these two theses claim that ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another, neither more fundamental than the other. Hale defends a broadly Fregean approach to metaphysics, according to which ontological distinctions among different kinds of things (objects, properties, and relations) are to be drawn on the basis of prior distinctions between different logical types of expression. The claim that facts about what kinds of things exist depend upon facts about what is possible makes little sense unless one accepts that at least some modal facts are fundamental, and not reducible to facts of some other, non-modal, sort. He argues that facts about what is absolutely necessary or possible have this character, and that they have their source or basis, not in meanings or concepts nor in facts about alternative ''worlds'', but in the natures or essences of things.
Get Necessary Beings by at the best price and quality guaranteed only at Werezi Africa's largest book ecommerce store. The book was published by Oxford University Press and it has pages.