On Consciousness

The philosophy-of-mind and the science-of-mind industries surveyed, judged and then radically redirected into a new theory of consciousness by an independent-minded philosopher.

Is your consciousness neural events in your head? Is it anything in there? On Consciousness offers answers to the question of the very nature of consciousness, and the separate question of how consciousness is related to the brain. It begins with Anomalous Monism, a doctrine seemingly to the effect that mind and brain are one thing with two kinds of properties not lawfully connected. It goes on to consider the thinking of neuroscientists and then functionalists. It reconsiders Honderich''s own Union Theory, and the anti-individualism that disconnects the mind from the brain. These doctrines are examined in terms of whether they satisfy our agreed criteria for decent accounts of consciousness. The book leads up to the question: ''What is it like for you to be aware of the room you are in?'' The bold new answer is: ''It is for the room in a way to exist''. Such an answer gives rise to analyses of reflective and affective consciousness as well, such as thinking and feeling. On Consciousness respects the most resilient proposition in the history of the philosophy of mind - that consciousness isn''t just cells. It also makes all of consciousness a proper subject for science.