Public Preferences and Institutional Designs : Israel and Turkey Compared

This book explores the existence of gaps between public preferences and institutional designs in democracies, and specifically cases in which such gaps are maintained for a long period of time without being challenged by the electorate.

This book explores the existence of gaps between public preferences and institutional designs in democracies, and specifically cases in which such gaps are maintained for a long period of time without being challenged by the electorate. Gaps such as these can be seen in the complex relations between the state and religion in Israel and Turkey, and more specifically in their policies on marriage. This line of investigation is interesting both theoretically and empirically, as despite their poles apart policies, Israel and Turkey share a similar pattern of institutional dynamics. Existing explanations for this phenomenon suggested either civil society-based arguments or intra-institutional dynamics, as reasons for the maintenance of such gaps. This book enriches our understanding of policy dynamics in democratic systems by introducing a third line of argument, one that emphasizes the effective role state institutions play in maintaining such arrangements for long periods, often against the public will.