Reasons Why

Reasons Why advances a new theory of explanation. The book argues that what philosophers are really after, or at least should be after, when they seek a theory of explanation, is a theory of answers to why-questions. This theory is defended against many examples designed to show that no simple theory like it could be true.

Reasons Why first argues that what philosophers are really after, or at least should be after, when they seek a theory of explanation, is a theory of answers to why-questions. It then advances a thesis about what form a theory of answers to why-questions should take: a theory of answers to why-questions should say what it takes for one fact to be a reason why another fact obtains. The book''s main thesis, then, is a theory of reasons why. Every reason why some event happened is either a cause, or a ground, of that event. Challenging this thesis are many examples philosophers have thought they have found of "non-causal explanations." Reasons Why uses two ideas to show that these examples are not counterexamples to the theory it defends. First is the idea that not every part of a good response to a why-question is part of an answer to that why-question. Second is the idea that not every reason why something is a reason why an event happened is itself a reason why that event happened. In the book''s final chapter its theory of reasons why is extended to cover teleological answers to why-questions, and answers to why-questions that give an agent''s reason for acting.