Repeated Games

Based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994, this landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with its masterful conceptual presentation. Challenging and important problems are set up as exercises, with detailed hints for their solutions.

Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.