Temporal Asymmetries in Philosophy and Psychology

Our attitudes towards an event may vary depending on whether the event has happened or has yet to take place. Philosophers and psychologists explore such psychological past/future asymmetries to reveal what kinds of asymmetries we exhibit, and under what conditions, and how they may reflect particular beliefs about time, or features of time itself.

Humans'' attitudes towards an event often vary depending on whether the event has already happened or has yet to take place. The dread felt at the thought of a forthcoming exam turns into relief once it is over. Recent research in psychology also shows that people value past events less than future ones, such as offering less pay for work already carried out than for the same work to be carried out in the future. This volume brings together philosophers and psychologists with a shared interest in such psychological past/future asymmetries. It asks questions such as: What different kinds of psychological past/future asymmetries are there, and how are they related? Under what conditions do humans exhibit them? To what extent do they reflect features of time itself, or particular beliefs people have about time? Are they rational, or at least rationally permissible, or should we aspire to being temporally neutral? What exactly does temporal neutrality consist of?