The Passing of Temporal Well-Being

It is now standard in philosophy to distinguish between lifetime well-being, how good a person’s life was for him or her considered as a whole, and temporal well-being, how well off a person was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time, or over some period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, a day, month, year, or chapter of a life. A major topic is how these two kinds of well-being relate to each other and this book dares to argue that there is no such thing as temporal well-being.

The philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being:

· lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person’s life was for him or her considered as a whole, and

· temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time (momentary well-being) or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, a day, month, year, or chapter of a life (periodic well-being).

Many theories have been offered of each of these kinds of well-being. A common view is that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being. This book argues that much of this literature is premised on a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being, because there is no such thing as temporal well-being. The only genuine kind of well-being is lifetime well-being.

The Passing of Temporal Well-Being will prove essential reading for professional philosophers, especially in moral and political philosophy. It will also be of interest to welfare economists and policy-makers who appeal to well-being