The Unknown Enemy : Counterinsurgency and the Illusion of Control

Western counterinsurgency doctrine proposes that improved socio-cultural understanding enables a greater chance of success in counterinsurgency warfare. Tripodi illustrates that in fact it often leads to the reverse. The Unknown Enemy illustrates how the drive for such knowledge results not in better outcomes but in a costly illusion of control.

Western counterinsurgency doctrine proposes that cultural intelligence is an important requirement for those forces operating amidst the unfamiliar socio-political structures often found in distant conflict zones. Yet while the determination to understand the intricate nature of alien societies may appear a rational undertaking in such circumstances, Christian Tripodi argues that these endeavours rarely help deliver success. The frictions of war and the complex human, cultural and political ''terrain'' of the operating environment render such efforts highly problematic. In their attempts to generate and instrumentalize local knowledge for the purpose of exerting influence and control, western military actors are drawn into the unwelcome realm of counterinsurgency as a form of political warfare. Their operating environment now becomes a space charged with phenomena that they rarely comprehend, rarely even see and which they struggle to exert any meaningful control over. All in pursuit of a victory that might literally mean nothing.