Time, Embodiment and the Self

This title was first published in 2000:  A demonstration the untenability of ’the new tenseless theory of time’ as espoused by D.H. Mellor, R. le Poidevin et al.

This title was first published in 2000:  Beginning with a sustained argument against the new tenseless theory of time and against McTaggart''s A series/B series distinction, the author of this essay goes on to provide a non-paradoxical, tensed, phenomenologically-based account of the ''going on'' or ''taking place'' of events in time that escapes the paradoxes endemic to ''passage'' as understood via the A series/B series distinction. The author then turns his attention to the other main aim of the essay, which is to seek an understanding of time adequate to those more ''embodied'' conceptions of the self that place character, and with it the ''constitutive attachments'' or ''ground projects'' of individual life circumstance, at the centre of the self. This involves a ''redrawing'' of the self informed by a wider conception of the will than the one we have inherited via Descartes and Kant, by an account of ground projects, and by the theory of the tripartite psyche in Plato''s Republic.