What It Is Like To Perceive : Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception
Book Details
Format
Hardback or Cased Book
ISBN-10
0190854758
ISBN-13
9780190854751
Publisher
Oxford University Press Inc
Imprint
Oxford University Press Inc
Country of Manufacture
US
Country of Publication
GB
Publication Date
Jul 19th, 2018
Print length
384 Pages
Weight
635 grams
Dimensions
16.30 x 23.90 x 3.10 cms
Product Classification:
Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledgePhilosophy of mind
Ksh 16,400.00
Manufactured on Demand
Delivery in 29 days
Delivery Location
Delivery fee: Select location
Delivery in 29 days
Secure
Quality
Fast
Thought, including conscious perception, is representation. But perceptual representation is uniquely direct, permitting immediate acquaintance with the world and ensuring perception's distinctive phenomenal character. The perceptive mind is extended. It recruits the very objects perceived to constitute self-referential representations determinative of what it is like to perceive.
Naturalistic cognitive science, when realistically rendered, rightly maintains that to think is to deploy contentful mental representations. Accordingly, conscious perception, memory, and anticipation are forms of cognition that, despite their introspectively manifest differences, may coincide in content. Sometimes we remember what we saw; other times we predict what we will see. Why, then, does what it is like consciously to perceive, differ so dramatically from what it is like merely to recall or anticipate the same? Why, if thought is just representation, does the phenomenal character of seeing a sunset differ so stunningly from the tepid character of recollecting or predicting the sun''s descent? J. Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought. Although all mental representations carry content, the vehicles of perceptual representation are uniquely composed of the very objects represented. To perceive the setting sun is to use the sun and its properties to cast a peculiar cognitive vehicle of demonstrative representation. This vehicle''s embedded referential term is identical with, and demonstrates, the sun itself. And the vehicle''s self-attributive demonstrative predicate is itself forged from a property of that same remote star. So, in this sense, the perceiving mind is an extended mind. Perception is unbrokered cognition of what is real, exactly as it really is. Maloney''s theory of perception will be of great interest in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
Get What It Is Like To Perceive by at the best price and quality guaranteed only at Werezi Africa's largest book ecommerce store. The book was published by Oxford University Press Inc and it has pages.