Why Democracies Fight Dictators

This book explores how liberal democratic elites'' perceptions of personalist adversaries--dictators--make democracies more likely to opt for military solutions than other regime types. Madison V. Schramm argues that when conflicts of interest between liberal democracies and personalist regimes arise, leaders in liberal democracies are predisposed to perceive personalist dictators as particularly threatening, and to respond with anger--an emotional response that elicits more risk acceptance and aggressive behavior. Building on research in political science, history, sociology, and psychology, Schramm provides a novel and nuanced explanation of why democracies are so prone to military conflict with personalist regimes.

Over the course of the last century, there has been an outsized incidence of conflict between democracies and personalist regimes--political systems where a single individual has undisputed executive power and prominence. In most cases, it has been the democratic side that has chosen to employ military force.Why Democracies Fight Dictators takes up the question of why liberal democracies are so inclined to engage in conflict with personalist dictators. Building on research in political science, history, sociology, and psychology and marshalling evidence from statistical analysis of conflict, multi-archival research of American and British perceptions during the Suez Crisis and Gulf War, and non-democracies'' understanding of the threat from Saddam Hussein''s invasion of Kuwait, Madison V. Schramm offers a novel and nuanced explanation for patterns in escalation and hostility between liberal democracies and personalist regimes. When conflicts of interest arise between the two types of states, Schramm argues, cognitive biases and social narratives predispose leaders in liberal democracies to perceive personalist dictators as particularly threatening and to respond with anger--an emotional response that elicits more risk acceptance and aggressive behavior. She also locates this tendency in the escalatory dynamics that precede open military conflict: coercion, covert action, and crisis bargaining. At all of these stages, the tendency toward anger and risk acceptance contributes to explosive outcomes between democratic and personalist regimes.